In the first part of this article an attempt was made to clear the ground for a functional theory of knowledge, and the discussion of structure and function with which it concluded enables us to approach the problem of cognition. If the view already set forth is sound, it seems clear that the relation of the mind to its object is a function and not a structure of the mental processes involved. The mere existence of a mental content, however complex (...) it may be, however decorated with fringes or set off by a background, does not constitute an act of knowledge or give the content a meaning. In order to see a mental act as cognitive we must consider its function, its origin, its results, and in general the circumstances in which it stands. (shrink)

The problem of knowledge is generally regarded as an essential part of philosophy, and since the time of Descartes at least, every philosopher has found it necessary to show that his own view can afford a solution to the problem. In this paper, however, the method of approach is psychological rather than philosophical, and an attempt is made to deal with the question from a point of view differing in several respects from those more commonly accepted.